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On October 26, 2001, the United States Congress hastily passed
(and President Bush signed) legislation' that significantly expanded
the tools available to law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism
and gather intelligence domestically.2 Concern about the impact of
this new legislation on civil liberties inspired lawmakers to initiate a
"sunset provision" that requires the bill to be reauthorized by 2005 in
order for it to remain effective.3 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the
Senate negotiator for the bill, reluctantly acquiesced to President
Bush's demands for anti-terrorism powers that may infringe on the
civil liberties of Americans.4 Despite these reservations, both Con-
gress and the American public appear willing to relinquish some per-
sonal privacy in times of war for the greater public interest.
Even when the nation is not at war, law enforcement personnel
use surveillance and investigative technologies on a daily basis. The
Supreme Court recently determined in a series of contradictory cases
whether the use of certain law enforcement investigative devices are
"searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Two of
these technologies are addressed in this Note: the use of heat-imaging
technology and the use of drug-sniffing dogs.
J.D. Candidate 2003, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., University of Virginia.
1. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
2. Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making; Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to Bring Do-
mestic Apparatus of Unprecedented Scope, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A4.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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In its 2000-01 term, the Supreme Court held in Kyllo v. United
States that the use of a thermal imager is a "search" within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment.' A thermal imager is a device that de-
tects infrared radiation and converts that radiation into images accord-
ing to its relative warmth.6 With the help of the thermal imager, the
person operating the device can see images of objects and people in-
side a building that emit infrared radiation.7 The use of this device
was a search because a thermal imager was not available to the general
public and was being used to gather details that could not have been
known but for physical intrusion into the home.' Therefore, its use is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. 9 During the same
term, the Court reiterated, in dicta, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond
that the use of a drug-sniffing canine by law enforcement is not con-
sidered a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.1"
Even though these two investigative tools are used to gather informa-
tion that would otherwise not be available without physical invasion,
the Court has concluded that while one is a search, the other is not.
This Note does not attempt to reconcile these seemingly contra-
dictory conclusions. Instead, the following paragraphs argue that the
Court's holding in Kyllo requires courts to rethink whether a canine
sniff is a search or not within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that a
canine sniff of an object is not a search." This conclusion was based
largely on the limited nature of the intrusion of a dog sniff, both be-
cause of the manner in which the information is obtained and the type
of information that is revealed.' 2 The argument is that the canine sniff
is so unintrusive that it could not infringe on an individual's expecta-
tion of privacy and therefore does not trigger the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.
13
With most other investigative techniques, the Court has consid-
ered four general factors unrelated to the characteristics of the search
5. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
6. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
7. Id. at 29. Virtually all objects emit infrared radiation, though it is not visible to the na-
ked eye. Id.
8. Id. at 40.
9. Id.
10. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000). The Court held that a road-
block set up for the purpose of drug interdiction was unconstitutional because it dealt with gen-
eral crime abatement rather than some more specific problem, such as checking for terrorists or
to catch a criminal who is likely to flee via a particular route. Id. at 42-44.
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itself to determine if there is an expectation of privacy. 4 Although the
thermal imager used in Kyllo had essentially the same characteristics
as a canine sniff in terms of the nature of the intrusion, the Court con-
sidered the traditional four factors rather than the limited-nature fac-
tors. This Note argues that, in light of the reasoning in Kyllo, canine-
sniff jurisprudence should be reexamined under the "expectation of
privacy" framework, which this author argues requires examination of
four factors, rather than the limited-nature framework, which exam-
ines the nature of the intrusion. Application of the expectation of pri-
vacy framework to dog sniffs would likely lead to a different finding:
the use of a drug-sniffing dog is a search, though it could be a mini-
mally intrusive one depending on the context.
The argument develops as follows. Part II provides a general
background on how the court has determined whether an investigative
technique or device is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and the implications for finding that something is a
search. This section focuses primarily on Katz v. United States, the
pivotal case in which the Supreme Court departed from previous
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment's core value is the protection of individual privacy, not
the protection of places. 5 In light of this background, Part III pro-
vides examples of how the Supreme Court has applied Katz to certain
factual situations, and what factors it has traditionally considered to
determine if a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Part IV exam-
ines the reasoning of the Kyllo decision and evaluates it in terms of
those traditional factors. Part V looks closely at the landmark case in
canine sniffs, United States v. Place, and analyzes the Court's reason-
ing in finding that a dog sniff was not a search. Finally, Part VI ex-
plores how and why the reasoning in Place and other dog-sniff cases
has been eroded by the Court's reasoning and holding in Kyllo.
II. WHEN IS A SEARCH REALLY A SEARCH? KATZ V. UNITED
STATES
The Fourth Amendment establishes the right of individuals to
be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures."16 Since its adoption, the question of
when a Fourth Amendment search 7 has occurred has not been easily
14. See Part III infra for a discussion of the four general factors considered by courts when
determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz.
15. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. To "search" means "[tlo look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to
explore; to examine by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a
Seattle University Law Review
answered.18 However, the implications for such a finding are signifi-
cant.
Characterizing an action as a search is essentially a conclusion
about whether the Fourth Amendment even applies.19 Police tactics
are not subject to judicial regulation unless deemed a search 21 (al-
though techniques deemed not a search could still be regulated statu-
torily 21). Without judicial regulation, the police are free to use such
methods at random, with little or no constitutional limit on their dis-
cretion.22 Moreover, any evidence gathered in the course of such ac-
tion would always be admissible in a criminal trial, unless excluded
under some theory other than a Fourth Amendment violation.23
However, if an action is a search then it must satisfy the Fourth
Amendment requirements: it must be reasonable; the officer must
have probable cause; and the search may only be properly conducted
when a warrant is obtained from a neutral magistrate, unless there are
exigent circumstances. 24  Therefore, calling a police action a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has implications for
both the rights of the individual and the permissible actions of law en-
forcement officers.
Prior to Katz v. United States, arguments regarding whether a
police tactic was a search centered on the common law idea of tres-
pass." Under this common law approach, a tactic was only a search if
it was in the form of trespass on tangible property; an "invasion" was
required to trigger Fourth Amendment protections. 26 The Katz Court
rejected this traditional formulation. 27 In Katz, the Court reconceptu-
alized the Fourth Amendment, turning the focus from the trespassory
formulation to the core value that -p[the modern Fourth Amendment
thief." N. Webster, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (1828) (re-
print 6th ed. 1989). This is what was in the mind of the framers at the time the Fourth Amend-
ment was adopted, and the definition is still considered by the Supreme Court today. See Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 n.1 (2001). It is instructive to keep this common usage in mind
when analyzing police tactics.
18. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
19. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982).
20. David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun
Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 39 (1996).
21. Id. at n.226.
22. Id. at 39.
23. Id. at 19.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see generally, 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
4. (a)-(b), § 4.2 (§ 4.1 discusses the Court's preference for warrants and the requirements of war-
rants under the Fourth Amendment; § 4.2 discusses general circumstances in which a search may
be permissible without a warrant).
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
26. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928).
27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350, 353.
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was intended to protect: individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion. 28 This is what Justice Stewart meant when he
claimed that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
29
In Katz, the Government attached an electronic eavesdropping
device to the outside of a public telephone booth, which enabled the
FBI to overhear the defendant's incriminating statements.30 In the
presentation of its case, the Government confidently advanced the tra-
ditional property-based rationale by arguing that use of the device was
not a search because it merely detected and translated sound waves
emanating from the phone booth.31 Therefore, there was no physical
penetration or trespass into the phone booth. 2
The Court rejected this mechanical application. 33 Despite the
prior cases equating Fourth Amendment protection to trespass, the
Fourth Amendment does not protect anything a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office.34 By the same to-
ken, what a person seeks to preserve as private, even in a public area,
may be constitutionally protected.3"
According to the Katz Court, a person has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy when a person enters a phone booth, shuts the door
behind him, and deposits the fee for the call.36 And society recognizes
this expectation of privacy as reasonable. 37 Given the defendant's rea-
sonable privacy expectations, the Court found that the use of the
eavesdropping device was an unconstitutional search, regardless of the
fact that the phone booth was in a public area and had glass walls that
exposed the caller further to the public eye.38
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated the two-part
test that is now commonly used to determine what protection the
Fourth Amendment affords to individuals in the context of searches.39
The first prong is subjective: Did the person exhibit an actual expecta-
tion of privacy?4" The second prong is objective: Is society willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable?4 Harlan emphasized the
28. Id. at 350.
29. Id. at 351.
30. Id. at 348.
31. Id. at 352.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 352-53.
34. Id. at 351.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 352.
37. See id.
38. Id.
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importance of considering the context of the search.42 Understanding
the context illuminates how much protection the Fourth Amendment
affords in a given situation.4 3 Therefore, deciding how much protec-
tion the Fourth Amendment affords requires reference to "place.
44
In this sense, Harlan was unwilling to completely abandon the tradi-
tional understanding that there are constitutionally protected areas.
The Katz expectation of privacy test is the starting point for any in-
quiry into whether a search is really a search under the Fourth
Amendment.45
III. APPLICATION OF KATZ IN CASE LAW
The Supreme Court's application of the Katz expectation of pri-
vacy test to determine Fourth Amendment protections is not only dif-
ficult to apply, but has often been criticized as circular, subjective, and
unpredictable.46 The difficulty in application generally arises with the
search of places that are not seen as "constitutionally protected areas,"
such as telephone booths, automobiles, and uncovered portions of
residences. 47  Departing from the pre-Katz bright-line trespass test
and moving to the more subjective expectation of privacy rationale has
generated extremely fact-specific inquiries."a
Given the required case-by-case analysis, courts have been reluc-
tant to develop an overall construct to classify situations that are gov-
erned by the Fourth Amendment and those that are not. However,
most cases have focused on balancing four primary factors, each of
which the Kyllo Court evaluated,49 to determine the privacy expecta-
tions in a given situation. These factors are the meat of the two-
pronged Katz test and are used to analyze whether a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy exists in a given situation.
The four factors gleaned from the case law are as follows. First,
is the technique sense-enhancing?0 If not, there is generally no




45. Harris, supra note 20, at 17.
46. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(d) (3d ed. 1996); Richard A.
Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188.
47. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 26, 34 (2001).
48. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 n.5 (1986).
49. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. These four factors are not laid out specifically in the Kyllo





traditionally associated with personal privacy, like a home?"1 This fac-
tor returns to the language of the Fourth Amendment and traditional
notions of constitutionally protected areas. Third, is the kind of de-
vice or technique in question generally available to the public? 2 If
yes, this factor permits an inference that the public should be on no-
tice that such a device may be used against them to gather informa-
tion. Finally, is the information obtained of a kind that could only
have been acquired with physical trespassory invasion into the area if
not for the assistance of the device? 3 This final factor echoes the
framers' intent behind the Fourth Amendment.
A. When Courts Find "No Search" Because There Is No Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy
In applying these four factors, the courts have determined that
some activities are not searches and therefore not subject to the rea-
sonableness limitations of the Fourth Amendment. For instance, if
the information gathered by a device could have been gathered with-
out using that device, then there may not be a search. 4 Similarly,
there may be no search if the kind of device or technique employed is
available and known to the general public, even if this kind of device
or technique is used to gather information in a constitutionally pro-
tected area, like a home. 5 The court also may find no search where
the defendant assumed the risk that revealing incriminating informa-
tion to a third party would be passed on to the police. By doing so, the
defendant exposes what is private to the public, in the words of Katz.
5 6
The following examples demonstrate how, in certain fact patterns,
courts have used these general concepts to find that there is no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy.
United States v. Knotts provides a good example of how use of a
sense-enhancing device might not be a search if the same information
could be obtained by the senses alone.57 In Knotts, the Court held that
the warrantless use of a homing device or "beeper" on the defendant's
car was not a search as long as the vehicle stayed in public areas."5 Be-
cause the same information could be revealed by visual surveillance,




54. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1983).
55. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989).
56. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
57. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276.
58. Id. at 282.
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a search nor a seizure. 9 However, if the device revealed information
that was not available to the public eye, the Court hinted that the use
would become a search (for example, if the car was monitored while
inside a private garage). 6' Therefore, in some situations, a police
activity is not a search if the same information could have been gained
without use of the device.
Florida v. Riley illustrates how a technique might not be a search,
even when the invasion is into a private home or curtilage, because it is
available to the general public.6 In Riley, a police officer flew a heli-
copter low over the defendant's greenhouse to see if he was growing
marijuana inside of it. 62 The greenhouse was located in the defen-
dant's enclosed backyard but happened to have portions of the roof
missing, permitting anyone above to see inside with the naked eye.63
The majority agreed that the defendant clearly had a subjective expec-
tation of privacy in the greenhouse given his efforts to prevent people
on the ground from looking in, such as placing tall fences, hedges, and
no trespassing signs around the area.64 However, there was no objec-
tive expectation of privacy because the helicopter had a legal right to
fly overhead.6" Moreover, there was no evidence suggesting that heli-
copters flying at four hundred feet were so uncommon that a property
owner would not be on notice of the possibility.6 6 Because helicopters
were a commonly available means of observation, the defendant was
on notice and assumed the risk that his property could be observed
from above by law enforcement.67
As suggested by Riley, courts often consider a defendant's as-
sumption of risk in determining whether a given technique is a search.
If a court finds that a defendant assumed a certain risk, the court will
likely find that the technique did not amount to a search. For exam-
ple, in United States v. White, the defendant made incriminating
statements to a friend, who happened to be a wired informant trans-
mitting conversations to government agents nearby. 6' The Court held
that the defendant could not have had a privacy expectation in his
conversation because every time two people converse, each assumes
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 445.
62. Id. at 448.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 448, 450.
65. Id. at451.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 450-51.
68. White, 401 U.S. at 746-47.
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the risk that the conversation will be repeated to the police.69 In this
case, White knowingly exposed to the public what he should have
kept private.7
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States7 illustrates how all four factors are applied to determine if there
was a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Dow Chemical, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency took aerial photographs of the Dow
chemical plant using an expensive but commercially available camera
commonly used in mapmaking. Because of this commercial avail-
ability and the fact that the pictures did not reveal "intimate details"-
that is, information that could only be gained by trespassory inva-
sion-the Court held that the action was not a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 3 However, if the chemical plant
had been near houses rather than in an industrial area, or if the tech-
nology was sophisticated surveillance equipment not available to the
public, such as satellite technology, a warrant may have been re-
quired. 4
These cases illustrate situations where courts have determined
that specific investigative techniques were not searches because the de-
fendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to the item
being searched. The Court's findings were based on such factors as
whether the technique was merely sense-enhancing, whether it was
available to the general public, whether the defendant assumed the
risk of exposure, and whether there was any invasion into a constitu-
tionally protected area. In addition to this type of expectation of pri-
vacy analysis, there is another line of cases where courts find that cer-
tain techniques are not searches. In contrast, however, this line of
cases finds no search because of the limited nature of the search itself,
not for lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item being
searched.
69. Id. at 752.
70. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no legitimate expectation of privacy
with respect to numbers dialed on one's telephone because the information is in the hands of the
phone company); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in certain banking records because customer has assumed the risk of disclosure by providing
the information to a third party).
71. DowChem.,476U.S.at227.
72. Id. at 229.
73. Id. at 238.
74. Id.
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B. Vhen Courts Find "No Search" Because of the Limited Nature of the
Intrusion
In contrast to the factors generally considered, as described
above, a small number of cases have turned on examining the nature
of the intrusion itself in order to determine whether there is an expec-
tation of privacy. The primary example of the "limited-nature" appli-
cation is the canine drug sniff. In United States v. Place, the Court
held that while a person has a protected privacy interest in the con-
tents of personal baggage at an airport, a sniff test is not a search be-
cause the technique is "much less intrusive than a typical search" (the
bag need not be opened) and it reveals only a single objective (contra-
band items).7" The Court said that this investigative technique was sui
generis-one of a kind-because of these unique factors.76
Apparently the technique was not so sui generis as the Court be-
lieved, because the same rationale was applied only a year later to a
chemical field test technique. In United States v. Jacobsen, the Court
found that a chemical field test performed by a federal agent to detect
cocaine did not constitute a search because it produced limited infor-
mation by means of a limited intrusion.77 It is worth noting that in
both Place and Jacobsen, law enforcement officers had a reasonable
suspicion that the defendants were involved in wrongdoing; these were
not random drug sniffs or testing.78 In Jacobsen, the Court emphasized
that the chemical field test did not infringe on any constitutionally
protected privacy interest because the subjects were engaged in illegal
activity; thus, any legitimate privacy interest the defendants had was
frustrated by their wrongful private conduct.79 However, the Court
has not generally followed this rationale because if a person had no
privacy interest in illegal activity, then the Fourth Amendment would
be rendered meaningless."0
75. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
76. Id.
77. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-24 (1984).
78. In Place, the defendant's behavior in the airport had aroused suspicion, and his identifi-
cation did not check out as accurate. Place, 462 U.S. at 698. In Jacobsen, a package containing a
duct-taped tube with plastic bags inside that had a white powder residue was damaged by Fed-
eral Express, a private actor, and opened by them pursuant to their private insurance claims pol-
icy. Once the Federal Express supervisor saw what was inside, he called in the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency and told them what was in the box. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111.
79. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 126.
80. Logically, the Fourth Amendment must still apply to searches for illegal contraband or
illegal activity. If it did not, then a police search for, say, illegal drugs would never have to com-
ply with reasonableness protections established by the Constitution. In other words, if illegal
activity was not protected, then the fruits of the search would justify its legality. The Supreme
Court has expressly rejected this notion in what is known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
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As Kyllo demonstrates, the Fourth Amendment protects privacy
interests regardless of the legality of the behavior under investiga-
tion.8' The next sections look closely at the Kyllo decision and the
Place and Jacobsen decisions to determine why the Kyllo Court did not
apply the limited-nature analysis found in Place, despite many reasons
why it might have, and whether this choice requires a reconsideration
of whether a canine sniff is a search.
IV. THERMAL IMAGING: KYLLO V. UNITED STATES
A. The Kyllo Facts
In 1991, federal agents received information from an informant
that Danny Lee Kyllo was growing marijuana in his unit of a triplex in
Florence, Oregon.82 At 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, law enforce-
ment officers sat in their car across the street from Kyllo's home and
scanned the unit for a few minutes with an Agema Thermovision
210.83 This thermal imager detects infrared radiation that is invisible
to the naked eye but is emitted by virtually all objects.84 Though the
imager would now be considered unsophisticated, at that time it was
cutting-edge technology and not available to the general public.8" The
imager converts radiation into images based on relative warmth-
black is cool, white is hot, and shades of gray indicate gradations of
warmth.86
From the heat distribution across the triplex revealed by the
scan, the agents concluded that Kyllo was using high-intensity halide
lamps inside his home, a use that is consistent with a marijuana-
growing operation." Based on informants' tips, utility bills, and the
thermal imaging data, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant au-
thorizing a search of Kyllo's home.88
B. The Lower Courts' Rationales and Holdings
The trial court held that the warrantless use of the thermal
imager on Kyllo's home did not violate the Fourth Amendment be-
doctrine. See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927) (stating that "[a] search prose-
cuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light.").
81. Mr. Kyllo was growing marijuana inside his home, which is, of course, illegal.
82. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 29.
85. Id. at 36, 40.
86. Id. at 29-30.
87. Id. at 30.
88. Id. at 30.
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cause no intimate details of his home were observed, and there was no
actual intrusion upon the privacy of the people inside the house.8 9
Therefore, the trial court reasoned, the use of the thermal imager was
not a search.9"
After a tortuous series of rulings and remands,91 the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court's finding that thermal imaging use was
not a search.92 Applying the subjective prong of the Katz privacy test,
the court found that, while moving the grow operation indoors might
indicate Kyllo's expectation of privacy, he did nothing to conceal the
heat radiating from his roof and walls.93 Kyllo was not trying to keep
the information private, and the court found that this lack of concern
indicated that he had no subjective expectation of privacy in the waste
heat.94
Next, under the objective prong, the court found that there was
no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the device re-
vealed only "hot spots" on the roof and walls rather than any intimate
details of the home.95 It is interesting to note that the court analogized
the thermal imager to a drug-sniffing dog, saying that "[tihe Agema
210 scan simply indicated that seemingly anomalous waste heat was
radiating from the outside surface of the home, much like a trained po-
lice dog would be used to indicate that an object was emitting the odor
of illicit drugs."96
C. The Supreme Court's Rationale and Holding
The Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Scalia and
joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit's analysis. Rather than consider the limited-
nature factors used for dog sniffs, the Court considered the four fac-
tors that have traditionally been used to determine the expectation of
privacy in a given situation.
89. United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 792 (D. Or. 1992).
90. Id.
91. The procedural history of this case was long and involved, spanning from the initial
trial court decision in 1992 until the Supreme Court reversal in 2001. The history is as follows:
United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787 (D. Or. 1992); affd in part, remanded in part, 26 F.3d
134 (9th Cir. 1994); opinion superseded, 26 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994); on remand, No. CR 92- 51-
FR, 1996 WL 125594 (D. Or. Mar. 15, 1996); on reconsideration, No. CR 92-51-FR, 1996 WL
571832 (D. Or. Oct. 3, 1996); rev'd, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998); opinion withdrawn, 184 F.3d
1059 (9th Cir. 1999); opinion superseded on rehearing, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999); cert. granted,
530 U.S. 1305 (2000); rev'd and remanded, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
92. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1047.
96. Id. at 1046.
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Focusing on the context of the search, the Court emphasized that
the thermal imager was used against a man's home.97 Consequently,
the Court held that "[w]here ... the Government uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the sur-
veillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant."98 Notably, all four factors that are generally evaluated to de-
termine if there is a reasonable expectation of privacy are represented
in the Kyllo holding. Specifically, the Court held that: 1) the imager
was a sense-enhancing device; 2) it was not in public use; 3) it was
used against a constitutionally protected area; and 4) it collected in-
formation that was not otherwise available without physical intru-
sion.
9 9
The rule adopted in Kyllo represents a long view because it en-
compasses both the relatively unsophisticated thermal imager at issue
in this case and the present and future sense-enhancing technologies
that may reveal details that cannot otherwise be exposed without
physical intrusion.' 0 This long view differs from the rule adopted by
the Ninth Circuit, which made a point of strictly limiting its decision
to the facts at hand.'
It is not clear if Kyllo would have been decided differently if the
device had been pointed at a structure other than a home, though ar-
guably it would have produced the same result. While language in the
decision suggests that the fact that the imager was used against Kyllo's
home was critical in determining that there was a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy,'0 2 there is no indication that the Court intended a
heightened protection of homes to apply when it came to the use of
technology. Two reasons support this interpretation.
First, as mentioned above, the Kyllo Court considered four fac-
tors to determine if there was a reasonable expectation of privacy.13
Whether the technology was directed at a constitutionally protected
area like a home was only one factor weighed among several, and was
97. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
98. Id. at 40.
99. See id. These four factors are extracted from the holding mentioned in the quotation
immediately preceding.
100. Id. at 36.
101. "While this technology may, in other circumstances, be or become advanced to the
point that its use will step over the edge from permissible non-intrusive observation into imper-
missible warrantless search, we find no violation of the Fourth Amendment on these facts."
Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1047.
102. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
103. As mentioned before, this test is not laid out explicitly in the case, but rather is
gleaned from reading the decision as a whole. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-40.
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likely not a dispositive one. Remember that in Florida v. Riley the
Court found no search when police used helicopter surveillance even
though the surveillance was on the defendant's curtilage, which has
been given the same status as a home. 10 4 Similarly, in Smith v. Mary-
land, the use of a pen register at the telephone company by police to
find out what numbers had been dialed was held to be no search de-
spite the fact that the numbers dialed were on a phone in a private
home.' In both of these cases, the Court found that the defendant
had no subjective expectation of privacy that was objectively reason-
able, despite the fact that the object sought was inside a home.
Second, in cases in which the Court has established a heightened
standard for homes, there usually has been a physical invasion. For
example, even with probable cause, the police must secure an arrest
warrant to arrest a felon inside his home (unless there are exigent cir-
cumstances), though the same person may be arrested without a war-
rant if he is contacted outside his home.° 6 In Kyllo, there was no ac-
tual physical invasion of the home. Thus, it is likely that the Court did
not intend to establish, in this situation, a heightened protection in
homes for sense-enhancing technology similar to the higher protection
developed for felony arrests in homes.
D. Implications of the Kyllo Reasoning
Kyllo rejects the limited-nature analysis used to review the prop-
erties of canine sniffs, as applied by the Ninth Circuit and by other
circuits that had previously decided the issue. Instead, after acknowl-
edging that a thermal imager is a sense-enhancing device, the Kyllo
Court analyzed the facts in light of the remaining three factors men-
tioned above: (1) the location of the item subjected to the search; (2)
the availability of the technology to the general public; and (3) the
type of information revealed.
First, in addressing the factor that the use of the thermal imager
was against a constitutionally protected area, the Court recognized
that a search of a home provides a ready criterion of the "minimal ex-
pectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reason-
able."° 7 The Court gave great weight to the fact that all people have a
subjective expectation of privacy in their homes regardless of the ac-
104. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
105. 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
106. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (the Fourth Amendment prohibits po-
lice from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a
routine felony arrest); compare State v. Smith, 767 So.2d 1 (La. 2000) (extended Payton to the
defendant's arrest within the curtilage of his home).
107. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (emphasis in original).
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tivity that is going on inside." 8 The Court stated, "To withdraw pro-
tection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police tech-
nology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."'0 9
Therefore, the context of the search was a crucial factor in the Court's
analysis of the issue; the Court looks far beyond the mechanics of the
search, which are the focus in the limited-nature analysis."' As Jus-
tice Harlan explained in his concurring opinion in Katz, the context of
the search is critical in determining the objective expectation of pri-
vacy."
Second, the Court noted that at the time of the search, the ther-
mal-imaging device used by the agents was not commonly available to
the general public."' Examining this factor is entirely consistent with
cases in which the court adopted the assumption of risk argument by
applying the Katz expectation of privacy analysis." 3 For example, in
Dow Chemical, the mapmaking camera was available in the public
marketplace, and the public assumed the risk of being observed and
photographed by it." 4 Because the thermal imager was not commonly
available, a person could have a reasonable expectation of privacy re-
garding the use of it against him or her.
Third, by measuring heat waves emanating from the garage and
one wall of a home, the imager revealed information about the interior
of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physically entering the home." 5 The Court thought it irrelevant
whether the details revealed were possibly benign or not "intimate," as
described in Dow Chemical; inside the home, "all details are intimate
details." '116 Nor is it relevant that the information requires an infer-
ence in order to be meaningful of wrongdoing." 7 According to the
Court, law enforcement used the device to obtain any information, re-
gardless of whether that information was intimate or even meaningless
without inferences.' 8
The Court rejected the argument that there was no search merely
because a thermal imager detects only heat waves radiating from the
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See text accompanying notes 75-80.
111. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
112. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
113. See discussion above of Florida v. Riley and United States v. White in text accompa-
nying notes 61-70.
114. Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238.
115. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
116. Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 36.
118. Id. at 38-39.
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external surfaces of the house and does not see through the walls.119
This mechanical application of the Fourth Amendment was not ac-
cepted in Katz (where the same argument was made that an eaves-
dropping device detected only sound waves bouncing off the exterior
of the phone booth) and was rejected again here.12° In fact, the Court
went so far as to say that "[r]eversing that approach would leave the
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-including imaging
technology that could discern all human activity in the home.
1 21
By not taking up the issue of whether the defendant took deliber-
ate and affirmative actions to conceal the heat emanations from the
suspected area, the Kyllo Court rejected the rationales advanced by the
lower court and the circuit courts in prior cases concerning thermal
imaging. The fact that Danny Lee Kyllo took no steps to conceal the
excessive heat waves coming from his home was immaterial to the ex-
pectation of privacy analysis under question.
Notably, the Supreme Court never addressed the rationale ad-
vanced by the Ninth Circuit that the thermal imager is like the canine
sniff because it is a nonintrusive device that reveals limited informa-
tion, and therefore is not a search. It appears from the silence and the
explicit use of the expectation of privacy factors that the limited-
nature factors were not relevant to the Kyllo Court in determining
whether an expectation of privacy existed that was reasonable to soci-
ety.
Kyllo is an important decision. It applies the contextually based
Katz expectation of privacy test, utilizing the general four factors
rather than the limited-nature factors, to an investigative technique
that is completely nonintrusive and reveals only limited information.
Because the thermal imager is truly limited in both the amount of in-
trusiveness and in the information it reveals, the Court could easily
have applied the Place/Jacobsen rationale, as the lower courts did. If it
had done so, it would have likely come to the conclusion that the use
of such a device was not a search within the Fourth Amendment; but
it did not.
This choice in Kyllo provides the necessary basis for overturning
over twenty years of jurisprudence holding that a canine sniff is not a
search. However, to understand how far the Kyllo holding reaches,
one must first understand the basis for the Court's holding that a ca-
nine sniff is not a search.
119. Id.at35.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 35-36.
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V. THE CANINE SNIFF: UNITED STATES V. PLACE
A. The Place Facts
In United States v. Place, a suspicious airline passenger's luggage
was detained at LaGuardia Airport in New York because of a reason-
able belief that the bags contained contraband. 122 The officials took
the bag to Kennedy Airport to have it sniffed by a trained dog that re-
acted positively to one of the two confiscated bags. 123 By the time the
sniff test was completed, the bags had been out of the possession of
the defendant for over ninety minutes. 124  The Court concluded that
ninety minutes was an unreasonable amount of time to detain a piece
of luggage for investigation based on reasonable suspicion; therefore,the seizure was unconstitutional. 12 After coming to this conclusion,
the Court went on to state, in dicta, that while the defendant did have
a subjective expectation of privacy in his luggage, the dog sniff did not
rise to the level of a search under the Fourth Amendment because a
canine sniff was a limited intrusion to the object being sniffed and was
only employed for the single objective of detecting contraband.
126
This proposition has made its way into established jurisprudence de-
spite only being dicta. 1
27
B. Criticisms of Place
The Supreme Court's decision in Place has been criticized for
many reasons. Critics have suggested that the Court's decision was
unnecessary because the case turned on the unconstitutional seizure
and was made without benefit of briefs or argument from counsel.
128
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun took the majority to task
for deciding the dog sniff issue at all. 129 He suggested that, while the
Court had adopted one plausible analysis of the issue, an equally plau-
sible analysis is that a dog sniff may be a minimally intrusive search
that could be justified in certain circumstances based upon mere rea-
122. Place, 462 U.S. at 698-99.
123. Id. at 699.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 706. This conclusion echoed the principles voiced in Terry v. Ohio, which estab-
lished that law enforcement may seize a person or an object for a reasonable amount of time
without a warrant where there is a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
126. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); City of Indianapolis v. Ed-
mond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
128. Place, 462 U.S. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
129. Id. at 723.
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sonable suspicion of criminal activity, as opposed to probable cause.13°
This rationale is based on the principles articulated in Terry v. Ohio.''
Under Terry, an officer can seize or search a person or object for a rea-
sonable amount of time without a warrant if there is an articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 32 Reasonable suspicion does
not rise to the level of probable cause and is meant to recognize the re-
alities of law enforcement, necessitating swift action to deal with
crime.133 This narrower finding proposed by Justice Blackman would
have the benefit of reducing the likelihood of false alerts by the dog
because there is already the suspicion that the subject is carrying con-
traband, thus protecting the privacy interests of innocent people.'34
Following the narrower rule and defining a canine sniff as a lim-
ited search under Terry would allow for the flexibility needed to re-
spect alternative scenarios, thus raising another criticism. Place dealt
with the sniffing of an object rather than a person. The Court makes
no explicit distinction between the two and does not take into consid-
eration the context of the search. However, in his concurring opinion,
Justice Brennan reminds the Court that in his Doe v. Renfrow dissent,
he expressed the view that dog sniffs of people constitute searches, but
that sniffs of inanimate objects may lead to a different conclusion. 3
Most would agree that having a dog sniff a person for drugs would be
intrusive and would probably subject the individual to some embar-
rassment, inconvenience, and perhaps fear.'36 Therefore, a more
qualified rule regarding dog sniffs would serve several important pur-
poses.
Allowing canine sniffs as investigative techniques free from judi-
cial regulation is too far-reaching and threatens individual liberties.
When Place was decided, the Court said that the dog sniff rule, which
departed from the traditional Katz expectation of privacy analysis by
focusing only on the limited intrusion of the technique, was valid be-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Place, 462 U.S. at 720. In Doe, a drug-sniffing dog falsely alerted a thirteen-year-old
student in a junior high school because she had been playing with her own dog earlier, which was
in heat. The student was then forced to submit to a strip search. See Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S.
1022, 1022-24 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting to Court's denial of certiorari).
136. One of the justifications the Court gave in Place was that the limited disclosure of the
technique "ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and in-




cause the canine sniff was sui generis. 3' However, a year later in
Jacobsen, the Court found yet another technique which fit the Place
limited-intrusion/single-objective criteria: a chemical field test for co-
caine. In their dissenting opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall
feared that the Place/Jacobsen rationale would permit law enforcement
officers to roam the streets at random with a "canine cocaine connois-
seur," alerting the officers to anybody walking down the street carry-
ing cocaine. 3' They went on to say:
In fact, the Court's analysis is so unbounded that if a device
were developed that could detect, from the outside of a building,
the presence of cocaine inside, there would be no constitutional
obstacle to the police cruising through a residential neighbor-
hood and using the device to identify all homes in which the
drug is present. In short, under the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment first suggested in Place and first applied in this
case, these surveillance techniques would not constitute searches
and therefore could be freely pursued whenever and wherever
law enforcement officers desire. Hence, at some point in the fu-
ture, if the Court stands by the theory it has adopted today,
search warrants, probable cause, and even 'reasonable suspicion'
may very well become notions of the past.'
39
The day dreaded by Brennan and Marshall may well have come
without the intervention of Kyllo, which sought to create limits upon
the "power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed pri-
vacy.' 14 0
The Place rationale is criticized also because its efficacy depends
on the infallibility of the tactic; that is, in order not to invade a per-
son's privacy, the well-trained dog must never falsely alert to a subject
without contraband, or the field test must never indicate a false posi-
tive for cocaine. In reality, false alerts and false positives do occur,
and no investigative tactic is foolproof. In the case of these tactics,
when a mistake occurs, serious intrusions on the privacy of individuals
could result.' For this reason, some argue, drug-sniffing dogs should
not be given carte blanche in our society.
142
137. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. The Court admitted that the defendant probably had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his luggage, but that it did not matter given the nature of the
search.
138. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 138.
139. Id.
140. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
141. There are many examples in case law that illustrate the serious invasions of privacy
that can occur as a result of false alerts. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind.
1979) (dog alerted to a schoolgirl who had no drugs but had been playing earlier with her dog
that was in heat); United States v. $639,558.00 in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
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Finally, the Place rule has been criticized because it justifies the
imposition on the individual by focusing on the result of the search-
illegal contraband. The Jacobsen Court, in making a reference back to
Place, claimed that persons engaging in private illegal activity have re-
linquished their expectation of privacy with respect to the illegal prod-
uct.143  However, this is counter to the basic constitutional principle
that what police find as a result of a search cannot play a part in de-
termining whether the search was justified. 4 4 In other words, the ends
do not always justify the means, though the Place rule suggests differ-
ently where drug-sniffing dogs are concerned.
C. States' Application of Place
Individual states have demonstrated some reluctance in accepting
without qualification the broad rule of Place in regard to their own
constitutional challenges to the dog sniff. 145  This may be because in
the vast majority of cases, including Place, there is already reasonable
suspicion before the sniff test is performed; therefore, getting a war-
rant to perform a sniff test legally is not a hardship to law enforce-
ment.
In addition, states are free to grant greater protection to their citi-
zens through their state constitutions than what is provided in the
Federal Constitution.'46 Although about one half of the states have
held that dog sniffs do not inherently raise constitutional issues, thus
accepting the Supreme Court's rule of no search,1 47 many others re-
(70 to 97 percent of all currency in circulation has traces of cocaine sufficient to alert a dog); State
v. Joyce, 885 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (trained dog failed to alert to 132 pounds of mari-
juana in a police car that it walked past on its way to sniff the suspect's car).
142. See Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1246 (1983).
143. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.
144. See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).
145. See notes 147 and 148 for a list of cases that illustrate states' disagreement over this
issue.
146. See, e.g., State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 715 (N.H. 1990) ("[O]ur [State] Constitution
may be more protective of individual rights than the Federal Constitution.").
147. The following cases illustrating jurisdictions that feel there is no constitutional issue
raised by dog sniffs are cited from Pat J. Merriman, One Dog Finally Has His Day: Canine
Searches and Probable Cause After State v. Joyce, 52 J. MO. B. 136 n.7 (1996): State v. Paredes,
810 P.2d 607 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Bass, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Foster, 433 SE.2d 109 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Idaho Dep't of Law Enforcement v. $34,000 U.S.
Currency, 121 Idaho 211 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); State v. Daly, 789 P.2d 1203 (Kan. Ct. App.
1990); State v. Fikes, 616 So.2d 789 (La. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Morrison, 500 N.W.2d 547
(Neb. 1993); State v. McDaniels, 405 S.E.2d 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Cancel, 607
A.2d 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); State v. Villaneuva, 796 P.2d 252 (N.M. Ct. App.
1992); State v. Riley, 624 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); State v. Slowikowski, 743 P.2d 1126
(Or. Ct. App. 1987); Walsh v. State, 743 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Brown v. Coin-
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quire that law enforcement demonstrate reasonable suspicion before
using a canine.148 At least one state, moreover, has found as a matter
of state constitutional law that a dog sniff is a search regardless of the
circumstances.'49 There is certainly no consensus in the states regard-
ing this issue.
The state of Washington, in its tradition of granting more pro-
tection to the individual than that stipulated by the U.S. Constitution
with regard to the Fourth Amendment,' requires an examination of
the circumstances before determining whether a dog sniff is a search
under Article I, section 7 of the state constitution.'' The Washington
Court of Appeals has stated that "[a]s long as the canine sniffs the ob-
ject from an area where the defendant does not have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, and the canine sniff itself is minimally intrusive,
then no search has occurred.""5 2 This framework appears to be a com-
bination of the limited-nature analysis adopted by the Supreme Court
for dog sniffs and four-factored analysis used for other techniques.
Nevertheless, the Washington courts are concerned with the context
of the sniff.
monwealth, 421 S.E.2d 877 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Stanphill, 769 P.2d 861 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1989).
148. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in a case decided since Kyllo, has determined that
under the Minnesota constitution, while a dog sniff around the exterior of a car in a public place
is not a search, an officer must still have reasonable articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal
activity in order to lawfully conduct a dog sniff around a car stopped for a routine equipment
violation. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 134 (Minn. 2002). See also cases cited from Pat
J. Merriman, One Dog Finally Has His Day: Canine Searches and Probable Cause After State v.
Joyce, 52 J. Mo. B. 136 n.7 (1996): States requiring reasonable suspicion before using canine:
McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); People v. Boylan, 854 P.2d 807 (Colo.
1993); State v. Phaneuf, 597 A.2d 55 (Me. Ct. App. 1991) (dog sniff is not a "search" of a pack-
age in Maine); People v. Lynch, 609 N.E.2d 889 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Watkins, 515
N.E.2d 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); In re Montrail M., 589 A.2d 1318 (Md. Ct. App. 1991);
People v. Rice, 482 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); McCray v. State, 486 So.2d 1247 (Miss.
1986); State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
149. See Pellicci, 580 A.2d at 716.
150. Washington courts have consistently held that article I, section 7 of the Washington
State Constitution provides more protection to the individual than the Fourth Amendment. See,
e.g., State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 186, 867 P.2d 593 (1994) (under art. I, section 7, police
cannot use thermal detection devices in warrantless surveillance of an individual's home); State v.
Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (art. I, section 7 protects garbage placed in can
on curb outside individual's home, whereas Fourth Amendment does not); State v. Stroud, 106
Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986) (under art. I, section 7, police cannot search locked contain-
ers in vehicles in a search incident to arrest).
151. Charles W. Johnson, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1998 Update, 22
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337, 350 (1998).
152. State v. Boyce, 44 Wash. App. 724, 730, 723 P.2d 28 (1986).
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D. Long-standing Dissent to the Canine Sniff Rule
As the above discussion illustrates, the Place rule is controversial.
It rests on a belief that the canine sniff is a unique and flawless inves-
tigative technique, so much so that the context of the search is without
consequence. The dissents to this belief have been vociferous over the
years. For example, in United States v. Beale (known as Beale III), af-
ter the Ninth Circuit majority finally determined that the dog sniff
was not a search, Judge Pregerson wrote a scathing dissent:
I write further mainly to point out that the majority, in telling us
that a dog sniff is not a search, fails to tell us what it is ....
When using dogs to ferret out contraband, the police are not
simply walking around hoping to come across evidence of a
crime. Instead, they are investigating. They are trying to find
something. They are seeking evidence in hidden places. If this
activity does not qualify as a "search," then I am not sure what
does."5 3
Kyllo is the vehicle that the dissenting parties have been hoping
for to reexamine the rule. Is the dog sniff really sui generis, or can the
same expectation of privacy analysis used in Kyllo be applied regard-
less of the investigative technique in question? The next section ex-
amines the similarities and differences between the technology of Place
and the technology of Kyllo to establish that a similar analytical
framework can be used in each in regard to whether a search is really a
search.
VI. IS A CANINE SNIFF REALLY Sui GENERIS? APPLYING THE
KYLLO FRAMEWORK
A. Similarities of Canine Sniffs and Thermal Imagers
When determining if the Kyllo framework can be applied to dog
sniffs, one must first consider whether the use of a trained dog is
"technology" in the same way as a thermal imager. A drug-sniffing
canine falls within the technology category for several reasons. First,
much like a thermal imager, a drug-sniffing dog is a law enforcement
tool used to reveal information that is generally not accessible to nor-
mal human senses. 5 4  Second, a drug-sniffing canine is carefully
153. United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1072 (1984) (emphasis in original).
154. It is well known that dogs have an advanced sense of smell. The dog's heightened
sense of smell was recently reported in the news with regard to the potential ability to sniff out
types of cancer in humans. One expert stated that a dog's sense of smell is anywhere from 1,000
to 100,000 times stronger than a human's. See Amanda Onion, Dog Doctors:Training Dogs to
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trained by his handler to provide the specific data sought-whether
there are specific drugs in a particular location.5 ' This is analogous to
an engineer designing a tool intended to identify certain data such as
the intensity of heat waves emanating from a building. Third, the in-
formation that is revealed by either the dog or the thermal imager is
meaningless without interpretation by someone else. The dog handler
must be trained to control and interpret the dog's signs, and a police
officer must be trained to use and interpret the data from the thermal
imaging device.1"6 Finally, while a well-trained and obedient dog may
be generally available to the public, a specially trained and certified
police work dog used specifically for sniffing out drugs is arguably
only available to law enforcement for that purpose. Similarly, a ther-
mal imager is generally unavailable to the general public.157 Given
these commonalities, it appears that a canine sniff is not so singular as
to require its own limited-nature analysis.
The second inquiry into the commonalities between the two
"tools" or "devices" is the extent of intrusiveness of the two tech-
niques. Is the dog sniff so much less intrusive than other techniques
or devices as to justify its own analysis regardless of context? Place
found that a dog sniff is substantially less intrusive than other typical
searches.15 However, it is clear that, depending on the circumstances,
a dog sniff could be highly intrusive-for example, the sniffing of per-
sons instead of inanimate objects. The Kyllo Court, on the other
hand, did not even consider intrusiveness as a relevant factor in its
privacy analysis. If it had considered it, the Court certainly would
have concluded that use of a thermal imager is even less intrusive than
a dog sniff, which probably would have led to a final conclusion that
the use of the thermal imager was not a search at all.
Detect Prostate Cancer With Their Noses, ABCNEWS.COM (June 11, 2002), at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/dogs20611.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2002).
155. For an idea of the expectations of a trained police work dog, visit the website of the
North American Police Work Dog Association at http://www.napwda.com (last visited Oct. 9,
2002). Specifically, see http://www.napwda.com/bylaws/NAPWDA%20Bylaws%20and%20
Cert0/o20Rules%202002.pdf, pp. 8-29, which list the tests that police work dogs must pass in or-
der to be certified by the national association. One area of certification includes narcotics detec-
tion. See also http://www.wspca.com/PTRLSTND%204-1-02%20Red.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2002) for Washington State's General Performance Standards for police work dogs. The gist of
the established certification standards is that the dog and its handler must submit themselves to
rigorous training.
156. In Kyllo, a National Guardsman was brought in to interpret the data and operate the
machine. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp at 789.
157. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
158. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
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The final issue to overcome in determining whether the Kyllo
framework can be applied is whether the information revealed by the
investigative technique is unique, warranting a different analysis for
dog sniffs. When a trained dog alerts to an object, its handler infers
from the action that contraband is within the object of the sniff.
When a thermal imager detects certain levels of heat from a building,
its operator infers the presence of halide lamps, which indicate a mari-
juana-growing operation.' Both techniques reveal a limited amount
of information from which illegal activity is inferred. Therefore, it
does not appear that the technique reveals a unique factor requiring
differing analytical frameworks for different technologies.
The Kyllo framework, which reflects the four factors traditionally
evaluated under the Katz privacy test, is applicable to dog sniffs given
that a trained dog is considered technology. And, the unique factors
that supposedly were singular to dog sniffs-the low level of intru-
siveness and the limited information revealed-also existed in the
technology under question in Kyllo. However, not everyone agrees
that Kyllo should change how a court analyzes canine sniff constitu-
tionality questions. In State v. Bergmann, the Iowa Supreme Court
found that Kyllo does not disturb the twenty years of precedent re-
garding dog sniffs, especially considering the Court's recent affirma-
tion of the blanket rule in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.6 ' The Iowa
court found that "a drug sniffing dog is not technology of the type ad-
dressed in Kyllo to merit a divergence from the national and federal
case law developed regarding vehicle dog sniffs."16'
In contrast to the Bergmann court, a more plausible interpretation
of Kyllo is that it does require reconsideration of the blanket rule that
dog sniffs are not searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Kyllo provides the perfect opportunity to undo the damage of
making a ruling on a sensitive and important area like a potential
Fourth Amendment search without benefit of argument or briefs. In
light of the broad holding in Kyllo, the Place rationale no longer holds
water.
B. Why the Place Limited-Nature Rationale Should be Abandoned
By using the same limited-intrusion, single-objective rationale in
Jacobsen as was used in Place, the Supreme Court undermined its own
contention that a dog sniff is unique in the world of police tactics.
First, if that rationale had withstood the test of time, it would also
159. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.




have been applied in Kyllo because the factors that supposedly distin-
guished the dog sniff and the chemical field test from other investiga-
tive techniques were also present in the thermal imager. However, the
Kyllo Court did not choose to apply the limited-nature analysis or give
weight to the analogies put forward by the lower court between the
thermal imager and the canine.
Second, there is a general recognition that context-or, as Justice
Harlan calls it in Katz, "place"162-- does matter in situations examin-
ing the constitutionality of dog sniffs, as is indicated by the states' ap-
plication of the Place rule. Circumstances do exist where a dog sniff
would be a search by any standards. For example, if a dog was walked
around the outside of someone's home to determine if drugs were in-
side, under Kyllo, this certainly would be considered a search. In that
scenario, the trained canine is a law enforcement technique being used
to gather information that would not be available without physical in-
trusion, just like the thermal imaging device.
Third, the Court itself rejected the argument in Place and
Jacobsen that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy regarding the
subject of illegal private activity. In Kyllo, the Court found that, even
though Danny Lee Kyllo engaged in illegal activity, he had a reason-
able expectation of privacy inside his home. Moreover, it is against
long-standing constitutional principles to base the constitutionality of
a search on the result it produces.'63 Therefore, Kyllo returns the
search analysis to strict "reasonable privacy" expectations regardless of
the end product.
Fourth, while some may argue that a dog is not the kind of tech-
nology that Kyllo intended to address, an even more plausible argu-
ment is that a highly trained dog is within Kyllo's scope based not on
the physical characteristics of the device itself but instead on what it
achieves. Kyllo was concerned not with what type or how much in-
formation about the interior of the house was revealed by the thermal
imager, but rather that the technology provided any information that
was otherwise imperceptible to the human senses. This, too, is what
the drug-sniffing dog accomplishes.
For all of these reasons, Kyllo requires that courts analyze dog
sniffs under expectation of privacy factor terms, not limited-nature
terms. Under the traditional analysis, a court would likely conclude,
like Justice Blackmun proposed in his Place concurrence, that a dog
sniff is a minimally intrusive search that may or may not be reasonable
depending on the facts of the situation. The public is entitled to the
162. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
163. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).
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protection of the Fourth Amendment for such a potentially intrusive
investigative technique.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, to determine whether a person has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in an object that society recognizes as reasonable,
courts generally consider whether the item being sought is located in a
constitutionally protected area; whether the device used to seek the
item is available to the general public; whether the device is merely
sense-enhancing; and whether the information obtained could only
have been gathered through trespass without use of the device. In
contrast, for certain techniques, like the canine sniff, the courts aban-
don the issue of whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the item being searched and focus on the intrusiveness of the tech-
nique itself. This method of analysis for police tactics threatens our
notions of privacy. Kyllo is an affirmation and a return to considera-
tion of privacy notions for police tactics that are not intrusive and pro-
vide limited information.
The holding in Kyllo v. United States is far-reaching, as it was in-
tended to be. As Justice Scalia explains, "While the technology used
in the-present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in de-
velopment."' 64  The holding will affect not only future technologies
but perhaps also, as argued above, existing police tactics that are used
to provide information that is otherwise imperceptible to the human
senses.
Law enforcement investigative tools are becoming more and
more sophisticated and represent an increasing implication for per-
sonal privacy. Although we may be willing to relinquish some of our
personal privacy for the greater good, such as in times of war, in gen-
eral, privacy is something that must be zealously guarded. While
drug-sniffing dogs have not yet been used in a random dragnet fashion
against the general public,16' the potential is there under Place. More-
over, under Place, such an action may be constitutional because there
is no valid consideration of the individual's expectations of privacy.
Kyllo, on the other hand, is a guideline intended to limit the
power of technology to invade constitutional guarantees of privacy.
164. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36.
165. Courts have considered the issue of dragnet searches for drugs using canines in
schools, which raises special constitutional issues. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch.
Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982); B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir.
1999).
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All investigative technologies, regardless of their characteristics,
should be subject to an analysis based on these constitutional guaran-
tees of privacy to determine whether they are a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
